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Yu-ichi Hayashi†, Regular and Naofumi Homma††, Regular 
SUMMARY With the rising importance of information security, the neces-
sity of implementing better security measures in the physical layer as well 
as the upper layers is becoming increasing apparent. Given the development 
of more accurate and less expensive measurement devices, high-perfor-
mance computers, and larger storage devices, the threat of advanced attacks 
at the physical level has expanded from the military and governmental 
spheres to commercial products. In this paper, we review the issue of infor-
mation security degradation through electromagnetic (EM)-based compro-
mising of security measures in the physical layer (i.e., EM information se-
curity). Owing to the invisibility of EM radiation, such attacks can be seri-
ous threats. We first introduce the mechanism of information leakage 
through EM radiation and interference and then present possible counter-
measures. Finally, we explain the latest research and standardization trends 
related to EM information security.  
Key words: EM information security, TEMPEST, Side-channel attacks, 
Fault analysis, Hardware Trojan horse, Electromagnetic compatibility 
1. Introduction 
Today’s “information society” owes its existence to rapid 
advancements in the information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) field and the proliferation of personal ICT de-
vices. An important requirement for such a society is to en-
sure information security, including the protection of indi-
vidual privacy and the establishment of secure e-commerce 
channels. Information security can be roughly divided into 
three elements: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
These elements should be implemented longitudinally from 
the application layer to the physical layer; if they are not en-
sured across these layers, reliability and security will be de-
graded significantly, as each layer in an ICT device works 
under the assumption that information coming from the 
lower layers can be trusted. Because any vulnerability of 
hardware at the physical layer can critically decrease its se-
curity, ensuring the security of the physical layer is a vital 
issue for ICT devices.  
In this paper, we focus on electromagnetic (EM) infor-
mation security, a major component of information security 
at the physical layer. In particular, we focus on the issue of 
information leakage through electromagnetic (EM) waves, 
motivated by the serious threat such leakage represents in 
terms of its potential to degrade mobile ICT device in a non-
traceable and undetectable manner. 
The problem of information leakage through EM emana-
tion has been studied in a military context since the 1950s. 
This research approach is often referred to as TEMPEST, 
which is a codename for techniques and standards to sup-
press emissions that can compromise security. In the context 
of TEMPEST research, EM emissions from ICT devices are 
defined as “unintentional intelligence-bearing signals,” 
which, if intercepted and analyzed can disclose the infor-
mation transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise pro-
cessed by any information-processing equipment [1].  
TEMPEST research includes, among other factors, tech-
nologies for suppressing unnecessary signals from ICT de-
vices and the underlying causes of EM emanation. In its 
early stages, technology for performing TEMPEST-related 
attacks required expensive and difficult-to-obtain equipment 
for monitoring EM emanation. In addition, the security com-
munity held the belief that such highly sophisticated moni-
toring was possible only in the case of government-level at-
tacks. 
In 1985, van Eck reported that the execution of 
TEMPEST attacks was no longer limited to governments 
and the military by showing that such attacks can be con-
ducted by virtually anyone [2]. He demonstrated that unin-
tentional EM emanations from a cathode-ray tube (CRT) 
display could be captured by specially designed devices and 
used to quickly reconstruct the state of the display. Follow-
ing this seminal work, TEMPEST-related research such as 
studies on the acquisition of EM emanations and infor-
mation extraction began to appear in academic papers and 
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Fig. 1 Overview of EM information security issues addressed 
in this paper. 
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inspired active discussion.  
In the 1990s, the risk of information leakage via EM em-
anation increased as computers became faster and less ex-
pensive [3]. Emerging analysis techniques exploited ad-
vanced signal processing and statistical techniques using 
substantial amounts of CPU time and memory. At present, 
ICT devices prone to TEMPEST attacks include many com-
mercial products that handle private and valuable data, in-
cluding CRT and LCD monitors [4-13], touch screen moni-
tors [14], printers [15], keyboards [16-19], central pro-
cessing units (CPUs) [20], and cryptographic modules [21–
28].  
In this survey paper on the field of EM information secu-
rity, we discuss the threats and mechanisms of information 
leakage through EM waves that can be used to compromise 
commercial devices and equipment and then describe the 
latest research and standardization trends for countering or 
deterring these threats. The remainder of this paper is orga-
nized as follows (Fig. 1). Section 2 briefly describes the 
mechanism of information leakage through EM waves unin-
tentionally emitted from ICT devices. Section 3 describes 
the measurement environment of EM waves and the process 
of recovering information from their measurement. Section 
4 describes countermeasures against both unintentional em-
anation and monitoring. In Section 5, we describe threats 
that degrade the confidentiality and integrity of devices as a 
result of EM interference, a phenomenon that represents the 
inverse of EM leakage and is known as the reciprocity theo-
rem for electromagnetic fields. We also outline threats that 
increase EM emissions from devices by intentionally chang-
ing the circuit design, thereby causing security degradation. 
Section 6 presents works relating to the standardization of 
EM information security. Finally, in Section 7 we provide 
concluding remarks.  
2. Information Leakage through EM Waves 
EM information leakage is primarily caused by EM radia-
tion arising from the time variation in generated/transmitted 
electrical signals produced by data processing within ICT 
devices (Fig. 2). In general, the level of EM radiation gener-
ated by an ICT device is regulated from the standpoint of 
EM compatibility (EMC). However, as the information leak-
age through EM radiation corresponds to the wave fre-
quency pattern, such leakage can occur even if the intensity 
of the EM radiation is less than the standard regulation value. 
Fig. 3 shows how information leaks occur through EM 
radiation. An integrated circuit (IC) processing data can act 
as a leakage source [29] if it produces a signal that includes 
information with frequency components corresponding to 
the time variation rate. Higher-frequency components are 
often propagated through EM coupling to device compo-
nents that behave as an antenna [30], resulting in spatial ra-
diation of the leakage following the frequency characteris-
tics of the antenna [31,32]. 
Such antennas can be in the form of a wiring pattern on a 
printed circuit board (PCB), a conductor constituting a de-
vice chassis, or a line connected to the device. EM radiation 
is usually generated through such unintentional antennas.  
Information included in a radiated EM wave can be ex-
tracted using a leakage model. An example of a leakage 
model for a display would involve EM radiation from an IC 
that serially processes data on the basis of screen drawing or 
from a path that transmits displayed image data. Based on 
the physical characteristics of the device, the frequency and 
periodicity of observed meaningful EM waves can therefore 
be determined. 
 
3. Measurement and Analysis of Radiated EM Waves 
Information acquisition from radiated EM waves com-
prises two components: (i) measurement of radiated EM 
waves and the information contained therein, and (ii) analy-
sis of measured EM waves. In this section, we first describe 
the environment (i.e., setup) for measuring radiated EM 
waves and then classify analysis methods based on their re-
spective observation times. Finally, we describe analysis 
methods performed following EM wave measurement. 
Fig. 2 EM information leakage from ICT device 
Fig. 3 Model of leakage of ICT device via EM field 
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3.1 Measurement of Radiated EM Waves 
Radiated EM waves are measured either in the time or fre-
quency domains. For these measurements, it is necessary to 
appropriately set various parameters related to measurement 
such as bandwidth, sampling speed, trigger, frequency band, 
observation period, etc. In addition, because procedures and 
interfaces for parameter setting differ considerably by meas-
urement device, and the operation of each device requires 
expert knowledge, it is difficult to develop common or 
shared operations.  
However, in recent years, application programming inter-
faces (APIs) and software development toolkits have been 
developed to enable common operability among many 
measurement devices. Using such APIs and libraries based 
on high-level languages, it is possible to overcome the issue 
of differences among measurement devices in developing a 
unified software that can control a variety of devices. 
For example, it is possible to set up measurement param-
eters for using a software-defined radio (SDR) as a measur-
ing device via software development toolkits such as GNU 
Radio [33] or MATLAB [34] without consideration of the 
details of physical measurement. Such software can also 
control signal processing and transmission procedures such 
as the signal modulation used in measurement. In this man-
ner, the hardware configuration used for attacks can be eas-
ily reconfigured to allow an attacker to measure radiated EM 
waves by downloading and running a program that analyzes 
the differences among signals produced by different devices.  
In addition to device control, the assumption of a common 
measurement environment allows for the use of various 
measurement parameters without the need for direct param-
eter estimation; in such cases, attackers (hobbyists) can col-
laborate with other attackers by using network computa-
tional resources to extract appropriate parameter values in 
an exhaustive (i.e., brute force) manner. In other words, at-
tackers do not require professional knowledge and skills be-
cause appropriate parameter values are available online (Fig. 
4). 
As an example, we look at the case of smart devices (e.g., 
smart phones) as targets of attack via radiated EM waves. 
Because such products have common models that are widely 
marketed worldwide, the necessary parameters for an attack 
can be estimated, published, and shared. The availability of 
shared parameter-estimation programs on the network 
means that attacks on the physical layer of devices using 
their EM radiation patterns can be executed in a manner sim-
ilar to attacks executed in cyberspace. 
3.2 Information Acquisition from Measured EM Waves 
This subsection presents an overview of information ac-
quisition processes based on the interception of EM radia-
tion. During operation, an electronic device will generate 
and emit radio signals that often contain encoded infor-
mation as a result of the electrical switching processes oc-
curring in its digital circuitry. This can occur even when the 
emitted signal is suppressed in accordance with EMC stand-
ards. The intermediate or final results of device operation 
can be acquired from such EM emission signals; two typical 
methods for doing so are discussed as follows. 
3.2.1 Information Acquisition Based on Single Observa-
tion 
This method involves the acquisition of one or more EM sig-
nals emitted during a target operation. Following acquisition, 
the attacker attempts to extract the desired information di-
rectly from the EM trace. Although this method requires de-
tailed knowledge regarding the implementation of the target 
device, it is feasible even if only one or a few traces are 
available. 
For example, this method can be used to acquire infor-
mation directly from a monitor or keyboard. The color and 
Fig. 4 Parameter extraction by exhaustive search 
Fig. 5 Information acquisition based on single observation 
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contrast of pixels in a monitor are represented as combina-
tions of red-green-blue (RGB) voltage signals that change 
continuously as the image changes on the screen. Fig. 5 
shows an image of a display connected to a display control-
ler. When black characters are displayed on a white back-
ground, the voltage signals are turned ON and OFF in ac-
cordance with the shapes of the characters, and a specific set 
of ON/OFF signals is transmitted to the display controller 
depending on the displayed images and characters. The pat-
terns of these ON/OFF signals are altered by input from the 
keyboard. During signal switching, transient currents appear 
in the monitor for a short period of time.  
Such transient currents can be regarded as information 
signals with high-frequency components that are emitted 
through the device’s antenna or by a component acting as an 
antenna. Information can also be conducted through com-
munication and power cables attached to the device. 
Fig. 6 shows a display image reconstruction based on the 
measured time changes in the EM waves carrying the signals 
for drawing the display on a tablet PC. For touch screen de-
vices such as tablets and smart phones, the acquisition of the 
time changes in a software keyboard image displayed on the 
screen leads to information leakage of both the input desti-
nation and content. 
The signal observation method is also applicable to crypto-
graphic devices; in this case, it is referred to as simple EM 
analysis (SEMA) [26]. When a cryptographic device per-
forms two operations (A and B) based on a secret key, an 
attacker can identify the difference between the respective 
EM traces of A and B within a single execution step and sub-
sequently estimate the secret key from the sequence pattern.  
In general, SEMA attacks are suitable for public-key ci-
phers, which require a considerable number of computations 
to calculate each bit of the secret key. For example, the RSA 
cryptosystem [35], one of the most popular public-key ci-
phers, performs encryption and decryption through simple 
modular exponentiation. The typical exponentiation algo-
rithm performs multiplication and squaring sequentially in 
accordance with the bit pattern of the exponent correspond-
ing to the secret key. Thus, the key bit pattern can be derived 
by analyzing where multiplication and squaring operations 
appear in an EM trace. Several advanced analysis methods 
using chosen-message techniques have also been reported 
[36-38].  
The attacks described above have been shown to be appli-
cable to radiated and conducted emissions [28, 39] from lap-
top PCs and servers equipped with public-key ciphers. 
3.2.2 Information Acquisition Based on Multiple Obser-
vations 
The other primary acquisition method involves obtaining a 
large number of EM traces during a target operation and then 
performing statistical analysis on the obtained data to reduce 
noise and retrieve secret information. This method is power-
ful in applications involving ICT devices in which the EM 
emissions are of extremely low power but noisy. In addition, 
attackers do not require detailed knowledge about the imple-
mentation of the target cryptographic device. This method is 
known as differential EM analysis (DEMA) [26] and repre-
sents an important type of side-channel attack on crypto-
graphic devices. 
Fig. 7 shows the basic flow of DEMA (more precisely, 
correlation EM analysis (CEMA) [40]). In a typical scenario, 
the ciphertexts are known while the plaintext characters (i.e., 
messages) and secret key are unknown to the attacker; thus, 
the goal of the analysis is to recover the secret key. The at-
tacker eavesdrops on the ciphertexts corresponding to sev-
eral encrypted messages to acquire the corresponding EM 
traces, then guesses the value of a specific subkey and uses 
it to generate hypothetical EM values corresponding to the 
ciphertexts. It is important to note that, in modern ciphers 
the encryption process is determined in part by such subkeys 
(which might be, for instance, a one-byte key). In the case 
of the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [41] 
implementation, there are 16 S-boxes, each with a one-byte 
input and output, with each output independently combined 
with the one-byte subkey in the AddRoundKey operation. 
Therefore, the number of hypothetical EM values is at most 
Fig. 7 Basic flow of CEMA. 
Fig. 6 Image reconstructed from EM leakage from a Tablet PC [14] 
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256 (=28). Finally, the attacker calculates the correlation be-
tween the measured EM traces and the hypothetical EM val-
ues at an arbitrary time index to generate a correlation coef-
ficient trace for each estimated subkey. If the estimation is 
correct, the attacker would find a high peak value some-
where within the generated trace. 
Unlike SEMA, DEMA is primarily applied to symmetric 
block ciphers such as AES or data encryption standard ci-
phers [42], in which the EM emission is considerably less 
powerful than in the case of public-key ciphers, as symmet-
ric block ciphers are frequently used for encrypting larger 
amounts of data than asymmetric ciphers. By applying 
DEMA to several EM waves, it is possible to suppress the 
noise component contained in a radiated EM wave and ex-
tract its secret key information. Chosen-message power 
analysis has been proposed as another means of expanding 
the range of target algorithms [43, 44]. 
DEMA attacks are also known to be applicable to actual 
systems. For example, attacks have been reported on AES 
implemented in commercial CPUs and on RFID devices 
equipped with DES and AES [45-48]. 
4 Countermeasures against EM Information Leakage 
Countermeasures against EM emanation from ICT devices 
are primarily classified into two types. The first type in-
cludes countermeasures applied to EM emanation sources 
(e.g., large-scale integration (LSI) chips and devices) in 
which the information requiring protected from leakage is 
processed. The second type includes countermeasures ap-
plied to paths (i.e., source-antenna and antenna-receiver) 
from the source to the receiver.  
Depending on the application and usage environment, 
more than one countermeasure can be applied, as there is no 
universal solution satisfying the criteria of both high effec-
tiveness and low implementation cost for any device. The 
following subsections describe and provide examples of the 
two types of countermeasures. 
4.1 Countermeasures Applied to EM Emanation Sources 
The EM radiation from an ICT device is caused by the time 
variation in currents (produced, for example, by differences 
between electrical switching operations) generated by the 
data processing in the device. In this context, the electric 
module or device processing data are known as the “emana-
tion source.”  
For example, a display module in a PC or a cryptographic 
module in a mobile phone can be an emanation source. To 
better understand potential countermeasures to such EM em-
anation, we first look at how it is generated. A display mod-
ule such as a PC monitor uses video signals to produce a 
series of pixel patterns, and a combination of voltages within 
the signals is used to control the color on the display. The 
magnitude of the emitted EM signals depends on the varia-
tions in video signal voltage between neighboring pixels. 
Using this information, any image can be reconstructed by 
acquiring the appropriate EM signals, although the recon-
structed display image will be in grayscale mode with values 
corresponding to the magnitude of the EM signal alone. In 
this manner, voltage variation in a video signal can lead to 
information leakage via the emitted EM signal. 
One method for preventing such reconstruction is to re-
duce the contrast between the colors of the foreground text 
and the background image. This is useful because different 
colors emit different levels of EM radiation in rough propor-
tion to the luminance of the pixel. Based on the results in [3], 
removing the upper 30% of the spectrum produced by text 
to reduce the peak voltage level appears to provide a satis-
factory compromise between protection and rendering qual-
ity. The same author also suggested that randomizing the 
least significant bit (LSB) of the screen image as another 
source of noise is a better countermeasure [49]. 
A method in which a significant amount of noise is super-
imposed onto displayed images is presented in [50]. In this 
method, which takes advantage of the characteristic of hu-
man vision known as additive color mixing, mutually com-
plementary images are generated from a sequence of input 
images and a random image; these are then shown on a 
screen by flipping them in quick succession, which causes 
the human brain to perform color mixing. As a result, the 
images can be seen as intended on the screen but an attacker 
monitoring the EM emanation would not be able to recreate 
the images. 
Countermeasures against side-channel attacks on crypto-
graphic modules have also been reported [51]; such counter-
measures can be classified as either hiding and masking 
techniques. 
Hiding is implemented by removing the correspondence 
between side-channel information (i.e., power consumption 
and EM radiation) and processed data/operations. A typical 
hiding-type countermeasure against EM analysis attacks is 
to change the algorithm and/or circuit of the cryptographic 
module to produce a constant EM radiation pattern that does 
not change with the processed data.  
Fig. 8 illustrates the concept of a hiding-type counter-
measure. In Fig. 8(a), operations “A” and “B” are performed 
in accordance with the bit pattern of a secret key. The key 
can be revealed using the pattern in this figure because, in 
the absence of a countermeasure, the EM trace of A is dif-
ferent from that of B. By contrast, using a countermeasure 
Fig. 8 Example of hiding-type countermeasure 
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(for example, inserting a dummy operation B after each op-
eration A) results in the EM trace shown in Fig. 8(b), which 
indicates falsely that both A and B are performed for each 
bit. This prevents an attacker from deducing the specific pat-
tern of operations based on the secret key. In cases in which 
the dummy operation B can be distinguished from an actual 
operation B, an advanced hiding countermeasure such as the 
Montgomery powering ladder [52] can be applied to the 
cryptographic modules to prevent an attacker from identify-
ing any particular operations. 
Masking, on the other hand, is performed by randomizing 
the intermediate data processed by the module. In particular, 
the use of chosen-message techniques by attackers can be 
rendered ineffective using message masking. The capability 
of this countermeasure depends on the random mask size 
and the frequency of its update. To achieve a higher level of 
security, the mask value should be sufficiently large and fre-
quently changed according to the application of modules.  
Hiding and masking countermeasures have been devel-
oped and applied primarily at the algorithmic, architectural, 
and circuit levels. In [53] and [54], algorithmic counter-
measures in which operations are performed over a constant 
time interval independent of the secret key bit pattern were 
demonstrated using double-and-add and Montgomery pow-
ering ladder approaches, respectively. Although the counter-
measures developed in these studies can be easily imple-
mented, according to [37,55] they can be broken by attacks 
with chosen-message scenarios. In [37], a doubling attack 
using an input pair X and X^2 that could break a simple dou-
ble-and-add algorithm was presented. In [55], a comparative 
power analysis attack using an input pair Y and Z 
(Y^α=Z^β) that could break standard constant-time algo-
rithms including the Montgomery powering ladder was pre-
sented. 
Countermeasures at the circuit level provide another gen-
eral-purpose solution, although one that can be expensive 
and difficult to design. In this context, random switching 
logic (RSL) [56] and wave dynamic differential logic 
(WDDL) [57] are well known typical countermeasures for 
masking and hiding, respectively. RSL uses random data to 
mask the transition probabilities of inputs and outputs, while 
WDDL is an extended version of sense amplifier-based logic 
[58] that successfully balances circuit activity using comple-
mentary logic gates and a pre-charge phase. It is important 
to note that both of these countermeasures must be carefully 
designed to achieve completely-masked/hidden values.  
Threshold implementation (TI) [59] was recently intro-
duced as a circuit-level masking countermeasure and has 
been mathematically and experimentally shown to be robust 
against differential EM/power analysis attack (a type of 
side-channel attack [22]). However, the overhead of this 
countermeasure is non-trivial and prevention of advanced 
(i.e., higher-order) attacks would not be practical. 
An attacker who could closely approach the surface of a 
cryptographic LSI could defeat hiding or masking counter-
measures by precisely observing local information from a 
specific part of the LSI beyond the conventional security as-
sumptions (power/EM models, attackers’ capabilities, etc.).  
In [60], the possibility of exploiting leaks inside semi-cus-
tom application-specific ICs (ASICs) using microprobe-
based EM analysis was demonstrated. The work demon-
strated the measurement of current-path and internal-gate 
leaks in a standard cell and geometric leaks in a memory 
macro by placing a magnetic field microprobe on the chip 
surface. This suggests that most conventional countermeas-
ures would become ineffective if such leaks can be measured 
by an attacker. 
To address the limitations of conventional countermeasures 
against such attacks, a reactive countermeasure against EM 
leakage was proposed in [61,62] based on the general phe-
nomenon of electrical coupling between two conductive 
items in close proximity (in this case, a probe in the form of 
a looped conductor and a measured object). The proposed 
countermeasure uses an LC oscillator-based sensor to pro-
tectively react to any invasion of this nature. Such reactive 
countermeasures can be considered to be effective solutions 
to advanced EM attacks using high-space/time precision 
equipment.  
Fig. 9 Cost-effective electrical countermeasures using electric elements 
[63] 
Fig. 10 Countermeasure based on EM shielding film [14] 
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4.2 Countermeasures Applied to emission Paths 
Countermeasures applied to EM emission paths are also ef-
fective in reducing information leakage. Such paths include 
coupling paths (i.e., EM signals induced in an antenna by a 
source), any antenna generated by the physical structure of 
a device (e.g., printed circuit boards (PCBs) and connecting 
lines), and free space between an antenna and a receiver.  
Most conventional EMC techniques can be considered to 
represent this type of countermeasure. Typical countermeas-
ures applied to coupling paths and antennas include: i) con-
structing decoupling circuits between the power source and 
ground near the source (i.e., power decoupling); ii) devising 
a specific structure and wiring pattern for any PCBs in the 
device (i.e., PCB design); and iii) ensuring conductivity at 
the junctions of a package by installing conductive compo-
nents such as conductive gaskets and shielding connected 
cables by filtering components such as ferrite cores (i.e., 
package shielding).  
Any combinations of the above countermeasures can be 
employed, and effective reduction in EM emission can be 
obtained by combining and/or strengthening such counter-
measures because the intensity of EM emission also depends 
on the power of the source and the radiative efficiency of the 
antenna. 
Figs. 9 and 10 show examples of emission path counter-
measures. Fig. 9(a) shows a generated EM wave propagating 
from a cryptographic module to a power line connected to 
equipment through the wiring pattern of a board. The sup-
pression of this propagation is shown in Fig. 9(b) through 
the mounting of a decoupling capacitor onto the assembly. 
As another example (Fig. 10), the edge of a display screen 
can act as an antenna and leak radiation. It is possible to pre-
vent reconstruction of the screen image by attaching a 
shielding structure close to the antenna that effectively 
blocks the frequency causing information leakage.  
These types of countermeasures are not always available 
because office devices and systems are often leased. In such 
cases, the suppression of EM signals at the level of a specific 
site, building, or facility would be required for effective re-
duction of EM information leakage. In other words, the im-
plementation of countermeasures at these levels can be ef-
fective and sufficient even if some of the devices and sys-
tems performing data processing are left unprotected at an 
individual level. The requirements for such shielding are 
defined in [64] and [65]. For facility-level countermeasures, 
measurement and confirmation of the shielding performance 
are also required upon completion of construction. It is im-
portant to confirm whether EM signals can be measured 
from the best available position (e.g., the border between the 
facility and the outside environment) and how effectively 
EM signals can be suppressed by shielding. 
5．Other Types of Security Degradation by EM Waves  
In this section, we focus on the problem of security deg-
radation arising from disturbances induced inside of equip-
ment through intentional EM interference. We then outline 
the problem of security degradation arising from the delib-
erate modification of circuitry within a device.  
5.1 Security Degradation by Intentional EM Interfer-
ence  
Threats that degrade the availability of ICT devices via in-
tentional EM interference (IEMI) have been previously 
studied. In such cases, ICT devices can be overwhelmed by 
IEMI to the point of cessation of operation or even damage 
to circuit elements. IEMI creates a high-power EM environ-
ment (HPEM) that far exceeds the EM tolerance of an at-
tacked ICT device. Conventionally, the threat of IEMI to 
electronic devices using HPEMs was limited to certain in-
fluence areas, namely, governments and militaries; however, 
in recent years small-sized high-power transmitters and re-
lated devices have become commercially available, making 
the threat of IEMI to common ICT devices a more likely 
prospect.  
To address these threats, discussion and research on their 
mechanisms and corresponding countermeasure technolo-
gies is being actively conducted, in particular by the IEEE 
EMC Society [66,67]. In addition, the International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC) and the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) are including such threats in their 
standardization works and have defined the "radiative 
HPEM environment" and "conductive HPEM environment" 
as "the peak electric field strength more than or equal to 100 
V/m", and “the high-power EM current and voltage coupled 
or injected into cables or electric wires exceeding the volt-
age level of 1 kV," respectively.  
Furthermore, threats from the non-invasive degradation 
of the confidentiality and integrity of ICT devices using 
IEMI waves with amplitudes considerably smaller than 
HPEM levels have been reported. Devices vulnerable to 
such attacks include cryptographic devices [68, 69], micro-
phones [70], pacemakers [70], and smart phones [71]. Dur-
ing such an attack, a temporal fault is caused in the device 
by IEMI; the attacker then uses the failure to acquire confi-
dential information from the device in the form of, e.g., 
faulty outputs that include secret information. In another at-
tack scenario, the attacker rewrites the data transmitted 
within the device to an arbitrary value and then issues an 
arbitrary command to lower the confidentiality and integrity 
of the device.  
As countermeasures against such attacks, specific circuit 
techniques have been developed to detect unintended EM 
wave propagation within devices [72, 73], and EMC coun-
termeasures [74,75] can be implemented either inside or out-
side of devices to suppress EM wave propagation that can 
cause security degradation. 
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5.2 Security Degradation through Modification of EM 
Environment 
In this subsection, we discuss the problem of security deg-
radation arising from changes in the EM environment 
caused by the intentional modification of chips and devices. 
For reasons including cost reduction, hardware compa-
nies have recently made use of third-party foundries to inex-
pensively manufacture the IC chips that the companies de-
sign. This raises the possibility of adding functions not in-
tended by the chip designer to the IC at the time of manu-
facture that can be exploited by attackers to trigger IC de-
struction or security degradation under specific conditions. 
Such circuitry added contrary to the intention of a designer 
is called a hardware trojan (HT). HTs have been found at the 
government level and are now regarded as one of the more 
urgent security issues in the context of electronic attacks. 
The effects of HTs can include changes in functionality, 
reduced reliability, information leakage, or denials-of-ser-
vices [76, 77]. In general, however, HTs induce information 
leakage from devices via operations not included in the orig-
inal design (e.g., [78-82]). Possible methods for detecting 
HTs, include physical inspection, built-in tests [83], func-
tional testing [84-88], and side channel analyses [89-92]; 
these primarily target HTs located within an IC. 
In recent years, it has been shown that HTs can also be 
placed in peripheral circuits [93]. Unlike IC HTs, these do 
not need to be introduced at the time of manufacture and can 
be mounted on the surfaces of existing electric circuit com-
ponents; correspondingly, many devices on the market can 
be targeted, expanding the HT target object range. An HT 
that could be mounted on a device with low emission inten-
sity was reported in [93]. Instead of exploiting information 
leakage itself, the HT amplified the device’s emission inten-
sity through the application of IEMI [93]; thus, a prospective 
attacker could successfully obtain information from EM ra-
diation from even a few meters away. In the future, in addi-
tion to conventional passive attacks using naturally radiated 
EM waves, it will be necessary to deal with the problem of 
security degradation caused by such active attacks. 
6．Standardization on EM Information Security 
In this section, we introduce existing work on standardiza-
tion associated with risk evaluation and countermeasures 
used in EM information security. 
An information security management system (ISMS) is a 
set of policies that should be implemented and maintained 
by companies or organizations in relation to their infor-
mation security management or IT-related risks. The concept 
of ISMS arose primarily from the ISO 27001 standard 
specification [94]. The requirements of physical security in 
ISMS are provided on the basis of Recommendation ITU-T 
X.1051 [95], as well as ISO/IEC Standards 27001 and 27002 
[96]. These specifications and standards can be used to eval-
uate threats and mitigate their impacts from the equipment 
to the site level. The threats addressed in the these specifica-
tions and standards are essentially related to confidentiality 
within an ISMS.  
Recommendation ITU-T K.84 [97] describes threats in 
the form of information leakage arising from unintentional 
EM emanations and outlines two mitigation approaches: i) 
reduction of emissions from equipment, and ii) increasing 
the level of site shielding. In the first approach, emission re-
quirements and methods for examining equipment are ap-
plied when the equipment cannot be installed at a shielded 
site and emission from the equipment can be reduced. In the 
second approach, shielding requirements for sites such as 
buildings are applied when equipment can be installed at se-
cure sites. Methods for testing conducted and radiated emis-
sion related to information leakage are also presented in 
[97]; the purpose of this recommendation is to prevent infor-
mation leakage in the form of unintentional EM radiation 
from telecommunication equipment when the equipment or 
sites are managed by an ISMS.  
It is important to note, however, that this recommendation 
only covers information leakage from equipment in which 
raster scan video signals are present. Although it acknowl-
edges that information is transmitted through EM waves un-
intentionally emitted by various types of equipment includ-
ing personal computers, data servers, laser printers, key-
boards, and cryptographic modules, further updates to the 
recommendation will be required to fully cover such leaked 
signals. 
Another set of standardizations covers the requirements 
that should be satisfied by cryptographic modules with re-
spect to side-channel attacks. International Standard 
ISO/IEC 15408 (known as the common criteria) [98] is a 
standard for evaluating whether IT-related products or sys-
tems are properly designed and correctly implemented. It is 
noteworthy that all IT-related products are covered by the 
common criteria, although the security targets are left to be 
defined by the respective developers.  
There is another specific standard for evaluating crypto-
graphic modules; currently, ISO/IEC 19790 [99] serves as a 
security evaluation standard for cryptographic modules and 
covers eleven points related to their design and implementa-
tion. ISO/IEC 24759 [100] provides the derived test require-
ments for ISO/IEC 19790 [99], and detailed technical de-
scriptions related to non-invasive attacks including side-
channel attacks are provided in ISO/IEC 17825 [101]. 
7．Concluding Remarks 
The threat of information leakage through EM emanation 
is expected to increase as a result of technological advances 
in measurement devices and low-cost, high-performance 
computers and the development of advanced analytical tech-
niques. To effectively reduce information leakage through 
EM emissions, it will be necessary to use appropriate EM 
radiation suppression technologies based on EMC research 
in addition to conventional countermeasures implemented in 
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hardware and software. 
Designers of ICs and ICT devices should analyze their 
systems in their entirety as well as the manner in which the 
devices will be used to determine the extent of the risk of 
EM information leakage and then, if necessary, apply appro-
priate countermeasures. Even countermeasures that cannot 
prevent information leakage under all conceivable attacks 
can be realistically adequate in many cases. Additionally, it 
will become increasingly important for users to be conscious 
of whether such countermeasures are effective. 
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